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The Empty Demand for Solidarity 
Lisa Dillinger (University of Zurich) 
 
Abstract:  
In times of crisis, an increasing number of voices are being raised calling for solidarity. It can therefore be assumed that the 
ability to behave in solidarity is of public interest and should be cultivated. Can and must solidarity then be an educational goal 
and in what way could it be implemented? A first step in answering these questions is to determine the content of the concept 
of solidarity, which has been interpreted in many different ways. In this article, I follow Simon Derpmann’s understanding of 
solidarity in order to propose a pedagogical view based on it. Consequently, two educational goals can be named that are 
conducive to the cultivation of solidarity: First, moral identity as the assurance and commitment to one’s own moral convictions, 
and second, the ability to collaborate in order to pursue shared and common goals with others. Finally, there remains the 
question of whether solidarity has an intrinsic value for the education of subjects, or whether it is a political endeavor that has 
no educational ethical justification in pedagogical debates.      
Keywords:  
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In his novel “The Age of the Fish,” first published in 1937, 
Ödön von Horváth describes how the students in a school 
class ally against their teacher and try to have him replaced. 
The trigger for this resistance by the students was a 
reprimand from the teacher that seemed unjust and 
unacceptable to them. Thus, Horváth provides a literary 
example of what we generally understand by solidarity; a 
group banding together in the face of an experienced 
subjective injustice to take action against it. However, and 
there we see the morally inflated normative taint that often 
attaches to the notion of solidarity, the teacher’s rebuke 
referred to the fact that one of the students had made 
inhumane remarks toward Black people. Quite intuitively, 
the students’ behavior may rightly seem less valuable or 
praiseworthy to us in light of this information, and 
accordingly, we would possibly describe this scene less in 
terms of solidarity. Why do we resist describing the situation 
Horváth reports as one of solidarity? It seems plausible to be 
in solidarity with one’s classmates; after all, one feels 
connected to them because of the shared experience. The way 
they behave – they jointly write a letter to the principal – 
seems an appropriate means to pursue their end, so it is 
plausible to speak of successful solidary practice. If solidarity 
were an educational goal at the school Horváth imagines, it 
would have been fulfilled and the situation could be 
understood as a success. Nevertheless, there seems to be an 
implicit understanding of solidarity that cannot be reconciled 
with this situation. This article attempts to explicate these 
implicit assumptions and thereby, on the one hand, provide a 
foundation for pedagogical discussions of solidarity and, at 
the same time, show why the common use of solidarity, as it 
occurs in public discourse, is misleading and lacks content. 
In the following, therefore, a clarification of the concept 
will first be carried out, which does not so much aim at a 
generally valid notion of solidarity, but rather creates a basis 
for a fruitful treatment of the demands for solidarity, 
especially in the pedagogical context. In this framework, two 
educational goals that are prerequisites for solidarity will be 
focused on, namely moral identity and the ability to 
collaborate. Finally, the resulting ethical challenges are 
discussed. 
Concepts and Misunderstandings of Solidarity 
The theoretical treatment of solidarity in the Western world, 
as we know it today, goes back to the sociology of Emile 
Durkheim (2013) and in particular to his work “The Division 
of Labor in Society”, in which at the end of the 19th century 
he seeks an answer to the question of what unites people in 
industrialized times. For Durkheim, solidarity is thus a 
descriptive concept that explains how the functional 
differentiation of society creates new dependencies, which 
are the basis of modern society. It is only with the social 
philosophical discussion of solidarity that a normative 
understanding has developed. Habermas, for example, names 
it as the “flipside of justice” (Habermas, 1991, p. 100). While 
justice serves to protect the individual, solidarity is supposed 
to ensure the protection of the lifeworld, which is a 
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prerequisite for individualism in the first place. Brunkhorst, 
following Habermas, describes solidarity as a “form of moral 
thinking that integrates in the lifeworld and system” 
(Brunkhorst, 2002, p. 15). In this tradition, solidarity 
corresponds to the moral and altruistic inclination of human 
beings and represents a contrast to purely purposeful thinking 
and acting. Today, solidarity is accordingly used 
synonymously with a commitment against injustice of any 
kind or a responsibility towards others (see e.g., Young, 
2006; Held et.al., 2011; Arango, 2012; ter Meulen, 2016). 
Vogt therefore also speaks of a “moral grammar of 
solidarity” (Vogt, 2014, p. 95) and Wiggins goes so far as to 
regard solidarity as the “root of the ethical” (Wiggins, 2009, 
p. 239). 
When solidarity is publicly demanded in times of social 
crises, there is rarely a determination of the content of this 
demand. While on the one hand a basic competence for 
solidarity is assumed or presumed, on the other hand a certain 
understanding of solidarity is equally implied. However, 
some of the assumptions that underlie calls for or discussions 
of solidarity are built on misconceptions, so they lack 
significance. In the following, Derpmann’s concept of 
solidarity (Derpmann, 2013) will be introduced by clarifying 
two such misunderstandings, which should eventually allow 
for a constructive pedagogical discussion on the topic of 
solidarity. 
The first misunderstanding concerns the normative 
interpretation of solidarity as something fundamentally 
‘good’. This can be seen in the fact that the demand for 
solidarity – for example as a declared goal in mission 
statements or the like – is often stated completely without any 
definition of its content. Solidarity points beyond one’s own 
individual interest and allows people to collaborate with each 
other in the face of crises or injustices without inevitably 
being affected or equally affected. This moment of 
decentration from one’s own egocentric standpoint is 
certainly important for human development, but it is not 
necessarily morally desirable. As we have seen in Horváth’s 
introductory example – and in different historical events – 
solidarity understood in this way can also be present in 
individuals who ally themselves on the basis of a 
reprehensible cause. If one wants to interpret and understand 
solidarity morally, it is crucial to look at the reasons for it. 
What is important and normatively significant is therefore 
not the question of whether solidarity exists, but on what 
basis this solidarity exists. Simon Derpmann refers to this in 
his contribution in this issue as the ‘solidum’ of solidarity. 
He points out that not every situation that appears to be 
solidary can be morally justified (Derpmann, 2013, p. 201). 
Consequently, if we want to maintain solidarity as a 
normative reference, we need to be able to agree on 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons for solidarity. This 
involves understanding solidarity as a connection that 
individuals make on the basis of shared moral identifications 
(Derpmann, 2013, p. 27). Moral identifications are value 
judgements that have an action-guiding and identity-forming 
effect on the individual (Derpmann 2013, p. 37). In 
solidarity, such identifications, when shared with others, 
become their common cause. This gives both the 
identification and the relationship to those who share it a new 
significance (Derpmann, 2013). Understanding, then, that 
solidarity is not moral by itself, but is built on shared 
identifications that can be morally judged, suggests the 
relevance of determining the content of different solidarities. 
If the underlying identifications are ethically contestable or 
exclusionary, a substantive critique can be produced that is 
not possible in the case of indeterminate demands for 
solidarity and its interpretation as generally ‘good’. 
The dismissal of partial solidarity in principle represents 
the second misunderstanding concerning solidarity. Through 
the moral turn in the use of the concept of solidarity, the 
standard of moral universalism is applied to it. Solidarity, 
according to the common misconception, must be given to all 
people, otherwise it is biased and therefore to be rejected. 
Combined with obliviousness to the reasons for solidarity, 
this leads to an interpretation of partiality as a special 
relationship between persons based in singular affiliations. 
For example, as in Horváth’s story, students are assumed to 
be in solidarity because of their shared roles in school. While 
such roles speak to a particular relationship with one another, 
they are not sufficient to explain solidary connections and 
commitments that often extend beyond the shared 
experience. This circumstance is taken into account in 
different ways in theory. In part, a fundamental solidarity 
with others based on recognized shared humanity is assumed 
(Wiggins, 2009). Rorty makes suffering as part of the human 
condition the unifying feature of solidarity (Rorty, 1989), 
while Habermas speaks of solidarity if it includes “all 
subjects capable of speech and action” (Habermas, 1988, p. 
328) in the communication society. In one way or another, 
they describe an essential characteristic of human beings that 
grounds solidarity and is thus in principle universal. In this 
understanding, solidarity as a desirable moral activity would 
also be measured by the fact that it is felt universally with all 
(see, e.g., Brunkhorst, 2002). 
The criticism leveled against a partialist understanding of 
solidarity refers primarily to the idea that such preference 
must always be accompanied by exclusion, and that 
solidarity is then sometimes limited to arbitrary affiliations. 
This accusation is to be countered with a reminder of the 
above section on the reasons for solidarity. The moral 
significance of solidarity is measured by its underlying 
identifications. If these identifications are singular features 
that a person has not voluntarily acquired, their moral 
significance can also be doubted. On the other hand, there 
may be a desirable underlying moral identification that is 
conceivable universally as a principle, but the group of those 
who share this principle is nevertheless a particular circle of 
people (Derpmann, 2013, p. 85). 
 
 on_education  Journal for Research and Debate _ISSN 2571-7855 _DOI 10.17899/on_ed.2021.10.5        _vol.4_issue # 10 3 
 
Educating for Solidarity? 
If we understand solidarity with Derpmann, as a voluntary 
special commitment to others who share the same moral 
identification, certain goals can be named that can be pursued 
pedagogically to enable children to act in solidarity. The first 
goal concerns the ability to deal with ethical and moral issues, 
to recognize their relevance, to develop a point of view that 
can then guide one’s actions, and finally to articulate and 
come to an understanding about these moral identifications. 
In this context, we speak of moral identity (Hardy & Carlo, 
2011). In order for moral judgements to inform action, they 
must become an identity-forming variable in the self-image 
of individuals. Thus, not only is the competence to weigh 
moral issues required, but morality must be given such a 
central place in one’s identity that it becomes an obligation. 
Moral identity then also represents a model for explaining the 
congruence between moral judgement and moral action. 
Research on moral identity is currently limited mainly to 
moral psychology but integrates well with considerations of 
moral education. What is intriguing about this model is that 
it builds on and points beyond the question of moral 
judgement and its development to clarify how moral 
judgements become action-guiding and how they are 
weighed against other judgements, such as convention, 
personal advantage, or taste (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Moral 
education for moral identity is not to be understood as 
something that makes people ‘good’ in the sense of 
conforming to super-personal and externally defined moral 
principles, but rather as helping to clarify and articulate one’s 
own moral intuitions beyond that in order to be able to 
integrate them into one’s identity (Herzog, 1991).  
A second goal of education, if solidarity is to remain 
desirable, is the ability to collaborate. Collaboration differs 
from cooperation in that the former involves working 
together toward a shared goal, whereas the latter involves 
members of a group pursuing their individual goals. In 
pedagogical theories much attention is given to cooperative 
learning (e.g Slavin, 1983), group projects and cooperative 
working and learning mainly serve one’s own learning 
process which is understood as independent and individual. 
This model of course has its justifications but should be 
neglected for the present topic of solidarity. Solidarity does 
not describe the pursuit of one’s own interests, but the 
collaborative activity to achieve a common goal (Jaeggi, 
2001, p. 293). An exemplary way to strengthen collaborative 
skills is to teach “specific dialogic strategies for thinking 
collectively” (Rojas-Drummond et al., 2008, p. 179) in order 




The Art of not Anticipating – Solidarity as an Intrinsic 
Value 
Now, moral identity and collaborative abilities could also be 
taught and justified without attributing them to the ability for 
solidarity. Theories of moral education are as old as 
education itself, and the ability to collaborate could also be 
defended in terms of the demands that modern societies make 
on their workforce and citizens. At the same time, the 
demand for solidarity appears to spring from a political logic 
that uses it to pursue specific social goals that are rarely 
communicated transparently. As a result, a pedagogical 
demand for solidarity would have to face a whole series of 
accusations that recognize behind it, at best, paternalistic 
coercion and, at worst, ideological indoctrination. Under 
these circumstances, is there a need for a pedagogical 
discussion of solidarity, and is it at all legitimate to declare 
solidarity an educational goal? These questions can be 
answered in two ways. 
On the one hand, solidarity can be named as a goal in the 
context of political or civic education. However, it should 
then be noted that there is an extrinsic interest in this 
education, i.e., that a political objective is being pursued. For 
example, in the context of critical race theories, solidarity is 
set as a goal of education without defining it in terms of 
content, other than it should be felt with both close and 
different others alike (e.g. Mecheril, 2018). Implicitly 
however, it is quite obvious what specific kind of solidarity 
is meant and to whom it should or should not be extended 
(Mecheril, 2018). This kind of pedagogical discussion does 
not seem to do justice to the idea that children and future 
citizens should be enabled to independently discuss the type 
of society in which they want to live. Moral questions and 
principles can and should be addressed with them, but they 
must not be anticipated. In other words, education can only 
help to cultivate the ability of solidarity but should not 
prescribe on what grounds or whether solidarity is then 
actually practiced. Only then is it ethically justifiable without 
imposing one’s own values on a coming generation. 
On the other hand, an argument can be made for the 
intrinsic value of solidarity for the individual. A purely 
external, political interest in teaching new generations the 
ability to show solidarity would be a weak reason to deal with 
solidarity in educational terms. The argument that the 
capacity for solidarity can empower individuals in a society 
seems more compelling. The structures and institutions of 
society can appear overpowering without individuals being 
able to bring about change (see Young, 2006). In contrast, the 
awareness of already being in dependencies and relations qua 
existence and then connecting with each other on the basis of 
these dependencies and relations expands the agency of 
individuals by enabling them to pursue common goals. The 
ability to engage in dialogue with others on the basis of moral 
identifications and convictions not only legitimizes common 
demands (Jaeggi, 2001, p. 292), but also opens up the 
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possibility to reflect on and differentiate one’s own 
convictions, to come closer to one’s own self-image through 
collaborative actions. Solidarity is then not only an active 
expression of one’s own indignation, but also the ability to 
act in resistance. 
Conclusion 
Demands for solidarity, such as those made at the time of a 
pandemic, indicate a public interest in solidarity. Often, 
however, such demands are poorly defined in terms of 
content and this can be problematic for a concept such as 
solidarity, which is attributed many interpretations and 
aspects of meaning. For this reason, Derpmann’s (2013) 
understanding of solidarity was presented in this article, 
directed at two misunderstandings: that solidarity can be 
evaluated regardless of the underlying convictions that 
inspire solidarity and that solidarity should not be partial. 
Instead, it was argued that it is the reasons for and means of 
solidarity that must face moral scrutiny. If solidarity is to be 
a moral demand, the underlying principle must be universally 
valid, but solidarity itself must not. It is limited to those who 
share those principles. It is precisely the partiality expressed 
in the term that distinguishes solidarity from pure humanism: 
people who are in solidarity with each other are committed 
beyond the generally required morality, without this 
partiality arising from a special affective relationship. 
If one agrees with this understanding of solidarity and 
wants to discuss it in terms of education, the question arises 
with which abilities people are to be equipped so that they are 
able to practice solidarity. It has been suggested that two 
essential foundations lie in moral identity and the ability to 
collaborate. Moral identity describes the degree of relevance 
that morality assumes on one’s self-image, so that moral 
reasons, among other reasons, become action-guiding. The 
ability to collaborate enables individuals to agree with others 
on common goals and to pursue them. Assuming that the 
subjective principles are different, the ability to establish a 
common consent also plays an important role. 
Finally, an attempt was made to find answers to the 
question of if and why solidarity should be dealt with from 
the point of view of educational theory, or whether it in fact 
originates from a political logic and therefore if it would be 
an illegitimate influence to educate students for solidarity. 
This fear can be countered in two ways. First, solidarity is an 
important political and social skill that can be cultivated 
without concern as long as the moral principles on which it 
is based are not preempted. To this end, it is important that 
solidarity is not morally exaggerated and that the interests 
that exist in the capacity for solidarity are made transparent. 
A key difference between political and pedagogical demands 
for solidarity, therefore, is that the former must not be empty, 
but must state the grounds of solidarity demanded in order to 
be morally significant. Pedagogical demands for solidarity, 
on the other hand, must remain empty – or open – for ethical 
reasons to encourage the ability for solidarity without 
anticipating its reasons. On the other hand, an argument was 
made for the intrinsic value of solidarity by understanding 
individuals as relational beings who, as a result of modern 
society, live in structures that are contingent and often unjust. 
In order not to be powerless in the face of these structures, it 
can be essential to communicate, ally, and become active 
with others on the basis of shared moral convictions. 
Solidarity is thus also to be seen as an empowerment that 
helps the individual not only to submit to the given, but to 
question it. Solidarity can then be a tool for appropriating the 
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